RDP Without Port Forwarding Or A Public IP
Reach RDP, SSH, databases and internal web apps over an encrypted overlay with no port forward, no public IP and no DMZ jump host. Your open port count holds.
What the console looks like
What this actually does
Published RDP is still one of the most reliably exploited paths into an Indian mid-market network. The usual fixes, a jump host in a DMZ or a non-standard port, move the target rather than remove it.
The target machine dials outbound onto the fabric.
Nothing new listens on your public IP, so a port scan before and after the rollout returns the same result.
RDP, SSH, database ports, and internal web applications are all reached the same way, so you are not maintaining a separate exception for each protocol.
Access is granted to a named service for a named identity, rather than dropping a technician onto a whole subnet and trusting them to stay put.
Sessions carry technician identity and audit context, so you can answer who reached which machine and when without correlating three log sources.
The DMZ jump host, the non-standard RDP port, and the firewall rule nobody wants to own can all be retired once the path is proven.
What changes as a result
- No inbound rule, no port forward, no public IP requirement
- Removal of a genuinely common ransomware entry path
- One access method across RDP, SSH, databases, and web apps
- Session audit evidence in one place
- Verifiable: scan your perimeter before and after
Three ways to find out if it fits.
AD Readiness Review
Forty-five minutes on your directory and remote access, and a one-page verdict you can circulate.
Book the reviewThe 14-Day Pilot
Five criteria agreed in writing first, then tested on real endpoints. If it fails, you walk.
Plan a pilotTalk to Us
Tell us about your sites, endpoints and directory. We will tell you what the overlay changes.
Talk to us
Prove it on your perimeter in 14 days
Bring us your directory, your remote access and your sites. We will map what the overlay changes before anyone signs anything.